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C

ONSIDER for a moment the plight of one W. F. Skinquist,
famous psycholegal scholar. In the morning he is informed
that his seventy-three year old widower father refuses to consent
to an amputation of his left arm that will save his life. His father
explains he wants to remain whole so that when he dies he will be
able to hug his late wife in Heaven who, he says, is expecting him
to have all four of his limbs when she greets him. In the evening,
his seventeen year old daughter announces she is about to accept
the marriage proposal of a thrice-married, forty year old, graduate of the joint J.D./Ph.D. program in law and psychology at
Hahnemann University and Villanova Law School. W. F., growing grimmer by the minute, observes, "You realize those dual degree people are weird and can never find gainful employment."
"I know," replies the daughter, "but Stevie is so cute and I like all
those impressive initials after his name."
Should our overburdened subject take actions to force his father to have the life-saving operation? Should he exercise parental authority and forbid his daughter from marrying this clearly
inappropriate potential son-in-law?
Silly examples aside, poor W. F. is faced with one of the great
moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas of our time: How to resolve
the conflict between two ofttimes competing principles-paternalism and autonomy. Defined in terms most favorable to each
and looking at it from the perspective of Professor Skinquist, paternalism means acting in the beneficial best interests of those
who cannot act in their own interest;' autonomy means forebear* B.S., M.A., Ph.D. (Psychology), New York University; J.D., Yale University. Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; Professor of Psychology, Hahnemann University Graduate School Department of Mental Health
Sciences; Director, Law & Psychology Program, Villanova University School of
Law and Hahnemann Graduate School. The author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Stephen Anderer and Adam Rosen, students in the Villanova/Hahnemann Law & Psychology Program.
1. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIoMEDICAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1983); Dan Brock, Paternalism and Promoting the Good, in PATERNALISM, supra, at 237-38 ("Paternalism is action by one person for another's

good, but contrary to their present wishes or desires, and not justified by the
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ing from interfering in the expression of self-determination by
those who wish to make decisions for themselves. 2 The conflict
becomes a societal concern when the government volunteers or is
called upon to select which of these competing principles it will
exercise in a particular case involving one of its people. The
choice becomes particularly poignant when one of its citizens is a
member of what I am calling a vulnerable population, loosely defined for purposes of this Article as a group of persons that has
been traditionally viewed, at times presumptively, as incapable of3
deciding and making important life decisions for themselves.
These populations include children, mentally ill and mentally retarded people, the elderly, and, in some instances, it is hoped
4
more historical than current, women.
When government seeks to override the individual choice of
a member of one of these populations, the manner in which a
court resolves the dilemma tells us a great deal, not only about
how the legal system views these populations, but about whether
that system will treat all of us with dignity. After all, we are
merely part of that shifting majority known as the temporarily
able-bodied and temporarily sound-minded.
At the outset, I should reveal where I stand with regard to the
conflict. I am a card-carrying autonomist. I believe that one of
government's overriding social goals should be to promote
other's past or present consent."); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, Some Second
Thoughts, in PATERNALISM 105, 107 (Rolf Sartorious ed., 1983) ("Usurpation of
decision-making" is necessary component of paternalistic treatment).
2. Crain v. Kreibel, 443 F. Supp. 202, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The Supreme
Court has recognized that there is an "interest in independence in making...
important decisions." Id. (quotinq Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600).
"This right to autonomy is recognized as the generalized ability of individuals to
determine for themselves whether to perform certain acts or to undergo certain
experiences." Id. (quoting Note, Roe v. Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle? 26
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163 & n.17 (1974)).
3. Incapability of making important life decisions serves as the cornerstone
of determinations of incompetency, which courts use to justify exercise of the
parenspatriaepower of the state. See BruceJ. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15, 16 n.3
(1991). "The parens patriae power of the state allows government to engage in
decision-making in the best interests of persons who by reason of age or disability are incapable of making such decisions for themselves." Id. at 16 n.3.
4. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding state commitment law allowing parents to admit their children to mental institutions); Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1923) (sexual sterilization of mentally retarded inmates is
within power of State under Fourteenth Amendment); Rogers v. Commissioner,
458 N.E.2d 308, 322 (Mass. 1983) (involuntarily committed mental patient "may
be treated against his will to prevent the 'immediate, substantial, and irreversible
deterioration of a serious mental illness' " quoting Guardianship of Roe, 421
N.E.2d 40 (1981)).
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human dignity and individual autonomy. Each individual should
have the right to decide how to live his or her life, and more particularly, what types of intrusions each will allow on their bodily
integrity. Our society should be committed to respecting each individual's right to choose his or her own fate-even if the choices
the individual makes do not serve, in some objective sense, what
the majority would consider to be in the individual's best interest. 5 In short, each individual should have a right to make mistakes, and not to have those mistakes forcibly corrected or
overridden by the State. To use Robert Burt's more felicitous
translation of this idea, "[a]utonomy in a democratic society
might be defined as an adult's capacity to choose what his parents
6
might not have chosen for him or for themselves."
There is undoubtedly a role for government in carrying out
its parenspatraieresponsibilities, that is, its role as a beneficent and
loving parent. I do not dispute that the State has an interest in
7
caring for those of its citizens incapable of caring for themselves.
This interest does not, however, justify every good faith effort to
intrude, interfere, intervene, or become involved (the reader may
choose his or her own verb) in individual decisionmaking, even
when the government truly believes that its involvement is for the
individual's own good.8 As Justice Brandeis stated, and his statement is so often quoted that it has become trite, but is so singularly apt that I feel compelled to repeat it: "Experience should
teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Gov5. The principle that a competent person may make decisions for him or
herself, no matter how foolish the decisions may be, has substantial support in
the decisions of many federal and state courts. See, e.g., Tune v. Walter Reed
Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.D.C. 1985) (patient ultimately
decides whether to receive treatment); In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435,
442 (Ill. 1965) (holding that absent clear and present danger, patient's views
must be respected, even if considered unwise); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d
1232, 1235-36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (irrationality of patient's decision does not
justify determination of legal incompetence); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619,
623 (1973) (asserting "constitutional right of privacy includes the right of a mature competent adult to refuse ... medical recommendations that may prolong
one's life" and commitment to a mental hospital does not mean loss of this
right).
6. Robert A. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of in, andfor Children, 39
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 118, 126 (1975).
7. For an in-depth treatment of the vicissitudes of situations in which the
state seeks to exercise control over an individual, the reader is referred to the
excellent assortment of essays collected by Sartorius. See PATERNALISM, supra
note 1.
8. See Jack D. Douglas, Cooperative Paternalismvs. Conflictual Paternalism,in PATERNALISM, supra note 1, at 171, 196-99 (discussing differences between benevolent paternalism and paternalistic despotism).
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ernment's purposes are beneficent." 9
The Supreme Court has at least paid lip service to autonomy
as a social value.' 0 The Court has repeatedly held that " '[a]mong
the historic liberties' protected by the Due Process Clause is the
'right to be free from.., unjustified intrusions on personal security.' "" The individual's firmly embedded common law "right to
determine what shall be done with his own body,"' 2 is without
question "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and therefore protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.' 3 The Supreme Court has
also made clear that this right to personal security and bodily integrity encompasses a fundamental interest "in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions" about what will be
4
done to one's body and mind.'
Recently, the Supreme Court in three landmark decisions,
9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Making the case more strongly, John Stuart Mill stated:
[Olne very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control
....
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any one df their number, is self-protection. That the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (1956).
10. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (1992) (State not allowed to
forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to defendant over course of trial without
finding that no less intrusive methods of control exist, that medication is appropriate, and that it is essential for defendant's safety or safety of others); Foucha
v. Louisiana, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (1992) (insanity acquittee cannot be confined after
mental illness absent proof of-both evidence of mental illness and dangerousness to self or others necessary for continued commitment); Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 220-27 (1990) (discussing liberty
interest in not being forced to take antipsychotic medications - interest subsequently held insufficient to preclude forcible administration in light of administrative needs); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (convicted felon serving
sentence has liberty interest in not being transferred to mental institution without appropriate commitment procedures).
11. See, e.g., Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492.
12. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914).
13. Cf.Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (listing rights
protected under Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and noting
that common link underlying rights protected by the Due Process Clause and
within concept of ordered liberty is that their abolition would mean violation of
a "principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions of conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental").
14. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). The Court cites the idea
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Washington v. Harper,15 Zinermon v. Burch, 16 and Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep 't of Health, 17 reiterated these longstanding principles.
In Cruzan, the Court reinforced eight decades of prior decisions
when it said that "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment."' 8
In Harper, the Court specifically noted that the "forcible injection
of medication into an nonconsenting person's body represents a
substantial interference with that person's liberty."' 19
Nonetheless, when it comes to applying these rhetorically
ringing principles in particular cases, the Supreme Court, and the
lower courts they guide, honor these principles more by breaching them than by following them.2 0 In doing so, courts very often
make assertions, many times unequivocally, that appear to have
empirical support, or at the very least, should have such empirical
21
support.
of penumbras in the Bill of Rights as a basis for claiming a constitutionally protected "zone of privacy." Id. at 598-99 n.23 (citing Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
15. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). For a discussion of the facts involved in this case,
see infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
16. 494 U.S. 113 (1990). For a brief look at the facts of Zinermon, see infra
note 80.
17. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). For a discussion of Cruzan, see infra note 18 and
accompanying text.
18. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. The Cruzan court actually went so far as to say
that a competent person could refuse artificial hydration and nutrition, even if
such refusal would mean their certain death. Id. at 279. Cruzan involved the
question as to whether a vegetative automobile accident victim, who had been
deemed incompetent, could be taken off of artificial hydration and nutrition
upon the request of the patient's parents. Id. at 269. Although the Court stated
that an incompetent person should technically have no less right to refuse such
ministrations than a competent person, and recognized that a surrogate, such as
a parent, may act for the patient in deciding to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, the Court nonetheless upheld as constitutional a Missouri statute that required proof of the incompetent person's desire for cessation of life-support by
"clear and convincing evidence." Id.
19. Harper, 494 U.S. at 229.
20. Indeed, this was the case in Harper,where the Court articulated the nature of the inmate's liberty interest in refusing involuntary psychotropic medication, but nonetheless held that such rights may be suspended by a non-judicial
tribunal, in a non-judicial process, by a potentially biased fact-finder and with
absolutely no legal representation. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-33. For a more
complete discussion of the infirmities of such procedures, see Donald N. Bersoff,
Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems
for Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REv. 329 (1992) [hereinafterJudicial Deference].
21. In Harper, for example, the Court stated: "The purpose of the drugs is
to alter the chemical balance in a patient's brain, leading to changes, intended to
be beneficial .... " 494 U.S. at 229. In fact, in a great many of such involuntary
treatment cases, courts rely on the purportedly beneficent purpose of the treatment to distinguish the case from other forcible conditions. The beneficence of
these intentions, however, is by no means settled and is in fact a matter of con-
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In many of these cases, the American Psychological Association (APA) has attempted to provide methodologically sound social science evidence to educate courts and at times, to advocate
for a particular position so that the courts, it is hoped, will render
more informed decisions. Primarily, this evidence reaches the
court through the APA's role as a friend of the court, that is as an
amicus curiae.22 As general counsel for the APA, I was most proud
siderable controversy. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 455 (N.D.
Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352, 357 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974)
(juvenile inmates injected with psychotropic drugs for purposes of social control). Sheldon Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism and the Constitution,
72 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1727 (1984) (asserting that emergence of psychotropic medication regimes may have been driven more by desire to chemically restrain than
by therapeutic impact); see also Robert Plotkin & Kay R. Gill, Invisible Manacles:
Drugging Mentally Retarded People, 31 STAN. L. REV. 637, 639-44 (1979) (drugs
given for tranquilizing effect despite absence of medical evidence supporting
effectiveness).
Moreover, intentions aside, the question of whether the medications are
beneficial is also a subject of considerable debate. In fact, it is now beyond question that many of the medications sought to be forcibly administered to patients
have profound side-effects, which may cause permanent damage to their nervous
system and mental functions. See, e.g., ELLIOT S. VALENSTEIN, GREAT AND DESPERATE CURES: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF PSYCHOSURGERY AND OTHER RADICAL

TREATMENTS FOR MENTAL ILLNESS

(1986) (presenting historical view of variety of

current "accepted" methods of treating mental illness); Gerard Addonizio et al.,
Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome: Review and Analysis of 115 Cases, 22 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 1004 (1987) (describing potentially fatal disorder which arises as
consequence of using neuroleptic medication); Glenn E. Irwin &John E. Simon,
Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, I J. EMERGENCY MEDICINE 207 (1983) (discussing
treatment and symptoms of neuroleptic malignant syndrome, "uncommon but
serious complication of neuroleptic therapy"); Lawrence L. Kerns, Treatment of
Mental Disorders in Pregnancy: A Review of PsychotropicDrug Risks and Benefits, 174 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 652 (1986) (explaining exaggerated toxicity of
psychotropic medications to mother and developing fetus); Paul Plasky et al.,
Effects of PsychotropicDrugs on Memory: Part 2, 39 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
501, 502 (1988) ("all classes of psychotropic medication" may cause memory
damage); Som D. Soni et al., Lorazepam Withdrawal Seizures: Role of Predisposition

and Multi-drug Therapies, 1 INT'L CLINICAL

PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY

165 (1986) (cit-

ing increased risk of epileptic seizures upon cessation of benzodiazepine treatment); Noel E. Taylor & Harold I. Schwartz, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome
following Amoxapine Overdose, 176 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 249 (1988)
(describing potentially lethal response to all neuroleptics); PeterJ. Weiden et al.,
Clinical Nonrecognition of Neuroleptic-InducedMovement Disorders: A Cautionary Study,
144 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1148 (1987) (describing recognition of "extrapyramidal"
side effects in use of neuroleptic medication).
22. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological Ass'n, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599) (supporting right of mentally ill
prisoner to refuse psychotropic medication); Amicus Curiae Brief of American
Psychological Ass'n, Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (No. 85-673) (informing court about capacity of adolescents to make informed and competent
decisions regarding abortion); Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological
Ass'n, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140) (informing court
as to deleterious mental health consequences of Georgia statute criminalizing
sodomy between consenting adults).
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of the APA's role as an amicus during the 1980s, precisely because
the APA consistently supported self-determination. 23 Working
on these cases has, however, also been the source of great frustration because of the Supreme Court's seemingly increasing antag24
onism to social science evidence.
Two classes of cases very clearly exemplify the conflict between paternalism and autonomy. The first class involves the
rights of mentally disabled adults; 25 the second, the rights of
26
children.
To me, the paradigmatic case concerning mentally disabled
adults is the right to refuse psychotropic medications. 27 The case
usually arises when a person is diagnosed as mentally ill. Next,
there is a determination that the person is also either dangerous
to himself or herself or others, and, as a result, the person is involuntarily committed to a hospital. 28 At some point after commitment, hospital medical personnel determine that the best
course of treatment is some form of psychotropic medication,
29
which the patient then refuses.
This issue was before, but left undecided by, the Supreme
Court in Mills v. Rogers.30 The Mills court left it to the state
23. For citations to some of the amicus briefs filed for the APA, see supra
note 22.
24. For further discussion of the assertion that the Supreme Court misuses
and abuses social science evidence, see infra notes 151-184 and accompanying
text.
25. For a discussion of this conflict in the context of mentally disabled
adults, see infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of this conflict in the context of the rights of children,
see infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 210 (held that prison inmate may be treated
against his will with "antipsychotic drugs . . . if he is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in his medical interest"). For an in-depth treatment
of the legal, ethical and empirical issues surrounding the psychotropic medicine
controversy, see ABA COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION

(David Rappaport &John Perry eds. 1986);

see also Stephen Beyer, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 WIs. L. REV. 497 (discussing history of psychotropic drugs and
implications of involuntary treatment).
28. For a more complete discussion of the civil commitment process, see
RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM

597-802 (1990). For a critique and examples of the injustices of this system,

see BRUCEJ. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS
AND THE LAW (1972).

29. See, e.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 210; Loren H. Roth & Paul S. Applebaum,
What We Do and Do Not Know About Treatment Refusals in Mental Institutions, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS - VALUES IN CONFLICT 179
(A. Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey eds., 1982).
30. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
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supreme court to balance the competing interests of the State and
the individual involved. 3 ' The U.S. Supreme Court did decide a
similar issue in the related context of a convicted felon being
treated in a special unit for seriously mentally ill prisoners. That
case, decided over two years ago, is Washington v. Harper.3 2 For
civil libertarians and self-determinists the outcome was anything
33
but heartening.
As usual, the Court began its opinion by asserting that Mr.
Harper, the mentally ill prisoner in this case, had "a significant
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 34 However, using a reasonableness test, rather
31. Id. at 305-06. In Mills, a class of involuntarily committed patients
brought suit against the staff of a Massachusetts psychiatric hospital, alleging
that the forcible administration of antipsychotic medications violated their constitutional rights. Id. at 293-94. The District Court decided that forcible medication was impermissible without a finding of incompetency but the First Circuit
reversed and ruled that forcible medication is warranted under some circumstances even without a finding of incompetency. Id. at 295-97.
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the question of
whether an involuntarily committed patient retains the right to refuse antipsychotic treatment, it ultimately remanded the case to the First Circuit because
an intervening Massachusetts case raised the possibility that the Massachusetts
Constitution might provide broader protection than that provided by the federal
Constitution. Id. at 298, 300-03. The Court decided that a determination of
what the federal Constitution permitted might not control the outcome and
therefore did not issue what it saw as potentially amounting to no more than an
advisory opinion. Id. at 305. Consequently, this issue remains open as a matter
of federal constitutional law.
32. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
33. In Harper, state officials sought to involuntarily medicate a mentally ill
prison inmate pursuant to a state law that requires a pretreatment hearing
before a medical review board. 494 U.S. at 215. The prisoner claimed that
forced medication without a full judicial hearing violated his rights of due process, equal protection and free speech. Id.
The Washington trial court found that the requisite procedures satisfied
due process requirements as set forth in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
The Washington Supreme Court disagreed stating:
[The] State [can] . . .administer antipsychotic medication to a competent, nonconsenting inmate only if, in a judicial hearing at which the
inmate had the full panoply of adversarialproceduralprotections, the State
proved by 'clear cogent, and convincing' evidence that the administration of antipsychotic medication [is] ...both necessary and effective for
furthering a compelling state interest.
Id. at 218 (emphasis added) (citing Harper v. Washington, 759 P.2d 358, 364-65
(1988)).
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that regardless of the
"substantial liberty interest" involved, "an inmate's interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be
made by medical professionals rather than a judge." Id. at 231.
For an opposing view, see Judicial Deference, supra note 20.
34. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22.
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than a fundamental rights analysis, 3 5 the six-three majority held it
was not unconstitutional for the State to forcibly medicate him as
long as the compelled treatment was in the prisoner's medical interests and met the legitimate needs of the institution.3 6 The
Court found no constitutional requirement that the State seek a
judicial determination of either incompetence or the need for
compelled treatment.3 7 Rather, the Court agreed with the State
that a mentally ill inmate's interests "are adequately protected,
and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate
to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge. 38
Thus, the Court upheld the right of the State to allow the decision
to involuntarily medicate to be made by an administrative tribunal
composed of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the Associate Superintendent of the prison, all of whom could be employed by the
institution, rather than by an independent judicial officer, as
39
Harper had argued for.
35. Id. at 224. Distinguishing the constitutional standard given the average
citizen from an institutionalized one, the Court stated that " 'when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' " Id. (quoting Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Use of the "reasonable relation to legitimate
penological interests" standard represents a compromise the Supreme Court
has made in prison inmate cases. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85. This standard in
prison cases "was based upon the need to reconcile our longstanding adherence
to the principle that inmates retain at least some constitutional rights despite
incarceration with the recognition that prison authorities are best equipped to
make difficult decisions regarding prison administration." Harper, 494 U.S. at
223-24 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85). In deciding these cases, the Court has
weighed two considerations: the diminished, although not entirely absent, claim
of the inmate to constitutional rights, and the administrative needs of the institution. Id. Thus, mere invocation of the Harper case cannot justify the forcible
administration of medications for civilly committed individuals, since they cannot be said to have given up constitutional rights to the extent that a prison
inmate has. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (distinguishing prison context from
other situations).
36. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. The Court offered case law justifying diminished protection of prisoner's rights, but overlooked its observation in 1942
that, "[fQreedom to think is absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward workings of the mind." Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), rev'd, 319 U.S. 103
(1943). The Court no longer appears to advocate this position.
37. Harper,494 U.S. at 231.
38. For an analysis questioning the accuracy of this hypothesis from the
perspectives of cognitive and social psychology, particularly with regard to the
inadequacies of clinical decisionmaking by mental health professionals, see Judicial Deference, supra note 20.
39. Harper,494 U.S. at 229. The Court notes that this is the "primary point
of disagreement." Id. The only protection given under the policy is that
"[n]one of the committee members may be involved, at the time of the hearing,
in the inmate's treatment or diagnosis." Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 6 [1992], Art. 2

1578

VILLANOVA LAW

REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 1569

As I noted, the Supreme Court has yet to rule squarely on the
issue of forcible administration of psychoactive medication to involuntarily committed mental patients. 40 There remain, thankfully, at least some differences between how the Court scrutinizes
the constititutional rights of a hospitalized mental patient and
how it scrutinizes the same rights of a convicted felon. In Mills,
for example, the Court assumed "for the purposes of... discussion" that the committed mentally ill "do retain liberty interests
protected directly by the Constitution... and that these interests
are implicated by the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs."' 4 1 This statement, in and of itself, does not end the matter. Courts go on to balance such constitutionally protected interests against the interests of the State. 42 In addition to
exercising such police power interests as protecting society
against purportedly dangerous individuals, the State is seen as
having an interest in fulfilling its duty to treat the medical and
43
other health care needs of those persons in its custody.
On this essentially paternalistically-oriented principle, the
APA and its counterpart, the American Psychiatric Association,
take fundamentally opposite views. Psychiatry takes the position
expressed both in Harper44 and in an earlier court of appeals decision in the fourth circuit, United States v. Charters,4 5 that "the
Constitution ... cannot be stretched" into "protecting an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient's preferences about the
40. The Supreme Court has considered the issue of forced medication in
the pretrial phase of a criminal law hearing. In Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct.
1810 (1992), defendant Riggins, facing the death penalty and asserting an insanity defense, argued that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The Court held that such forced
administration of medication was unconstitutional absent evidence that the medication was appropriate, that no less intrusive alternatives existed, and that the
medication was essential for the sake of Riggins' safety and for the safety of
others. Id. at 1815.
41. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 n.16 (1982) (citation omitted).
42. In Harper for example, the Court "determined that state law recognizes
a liberty interest, also protected by the Due Process Clause, which permits refusal of antipsychotic drugs" and that this interest was "not insubstantial." 494
U.S. at 228-29. The Court then proceeded, however, to "virtually ignore[] the
several dimensions of that liberty" in permitting the prisoner's will to be overborne. Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); cf. O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
44. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychiatric Ass'n at 22, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599) (citing delay and disruption
of treatment as only positive outcome of allowing mentally ill patients to decline
antipsychotic medication).
45. 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
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sort of medical treatment, if any, he is to receive." 4 6 Thus, in
Charters and Harper, organized psychiatry took the position that
courts should override self-determination when psychiatrists conclude, in the exercise of professional judgment, that it is in the
47
committed mental patient's best interest to be medicated.
Organized psychology has taken a different view. The APA
acknowledges a strong interest in preserving appropriate professional discretion in the treatment of mental illness. The APA
does not, however, endorse giving relatively unbridled discretion
to mental health professionals, particularly those employed by the
government in state or federal mental health facilities, as is argued for by psychiatry. 48 The APA does recognize the positive
benefits of judiciously administered psychotropic drugs. 49 The
APA believes, however, that the benefit must be balanced against
the inherently profound violation of bodily integrity entailed in
such forcible administrations, 50 as well as against the difficulty of
accurately calculating the risk-benefit analysis of being medicated
46. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychiatric Ass'n at 22, Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599).
47. See id. In the Charters case, the government sought an order to permit
medical personnel to forcibly administer anti-psychotic medication to an involuntarily committed psychiatric patient over the patient's strong objections.
United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cir. 1988). Although Mr.
Charters had been found incompetent to stand trial and was legally confined
pursuant to a federal statute, there had been no determination that he lacked the
capacity to make a competent decision about his medical care. Id. Asserting that
confined patients are not stripped of their rights, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless
reasoned that those rights must yield to "the legitimate incidents of his institutionalization," and held that those rights would be sufficiently protected against
"arbitrary and capricious" violation by letting medical personnel make baseline
determinations about the need for medication, leaving the local district court in
the role of reviewer. Id. at 306-08.
48. Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n 29, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599) (State's demand for forcible
medication should be subject to review either by court or by unbiased administrative body).
49. Id. ("These drugs appear to be effective in alleviating the symptoms of
certain medical disorders.").
50. For a discussion of the multiplicity of autonomy violations implicit in
forcible medication, see Stephan Beyer, Comment: Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 497 (1980) (asserting
forced psychotropic medication violates liberty interests in mental autonomy,
bodily autonomy, mental integrity and bodily integrity). See also Sheldon
Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism and the Constitution, 72 GEO. L.J.
1725, 1729 (1984) ("[C]ourts generally have agreed that mental patients enjoy a
constitutionally protected right to refuse drugs and that states can override this
right under certain conditions."); Michael H. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of
Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 237, 253 (1974) (discussing statutes which attempt to "balance freedom
from coercive therapy against freedom from the debilitation of mental illness").
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with antipsychotic drugs in a particular case. 5 1
When the patient has been institutionalized as mentally ill,
the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs infringes on the
patient's constitutional rights. 52 It has been the APA's view that a
state's failure to respect a patient's competent decision com53
promises principles of personal security and individual dignity.
Government's power should be most restricted where the decision to administer medication raises the possibility of serious risks
to an individual's health and has no clear and predictable outcome. 54 Thus, a patient's competent decision to refuse medication is entitled to be respected even if that conclusion differs from
the one recommended by the treating physician. A competent
adult should not be forced by government to submit to unwanted,
intrusive medical procedures that entail significant risks. 5 5 The
refusal to take unwanted psychotropic drugs should only be overridden by a court or by a properly constituted administrative tri56
bunal, not a body of professionals.
The APA's position, as outlined above, has been submitted to
various courts since 1982 in the form of five amicus briefs. In
Harper,the APA reiterated its position concerning forcible administration of drugs but for the first time opined that a panel of
mental health professionals could be used to override a compe51. See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (D.N.J. 1979) (noting that
many patients treated with psychotropic medications could improve with smaller
doses or no drugs at all); Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychological
Ass'n 29, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599) (accumulating research on dangers of psychotropic medications).
52. See Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Medications, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179 (1980) (comparing two
cases which recognize right of mentally ill to refuse treatment under certain conditions, but also providing instances where this right may be overridden).
53. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (No. 80-1417); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (1988) (No. 865568); see also Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
54. For the APAs view of government respect for competent patient decisionmaking, see supra note 53.
55. For a discussion of precedent regarding respect of a competent individual's decisions, see Winick, supra note 3, at 21-22 n.17.
56. Until Harper, it was the American Psychological Association's position
that only courts possessed the social, moral, political and legal perspectives to
decide such ultimate questions as whether an individual's right to self determination should be overborne. For the APAs position on an individuals right to
self determination, see supra note 53. See also Judicial Deference, supra note 20;
Stephen J. Morse, Treating Crazy People Less Specially, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 353, 359
(1987) ("Social and legal decisionmakers cannot abdicate their responsibility to
decide normative issues by mistakenly assuming that the issues are medical
rather than moral and legal.").
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tent refusal to consent to the medication. 5 7 I believe that the
APA's agreement with the American Psychiatric Association on
that particular issue made it easier for the majority of the
Supreme Court to arrive at its ultimate opinion-a significant and
regressive decision that threatens the civil liberties of us all.
The Due Process right at stake in these cases is not merely
the right to be free from the arbitrary administration of antipsychotic drugs. Rather, it is the right of a competent adult to
make treatment decisions for himself or herself, even if they are in
some sense deemed unwise by mental health professionals or
58
judges.
This position requires the social sciences to address at least
two matters that are essentially empirical. In striking the balance
between autonomy and paternalism, one is confronted first with
the question of whether psychotropic medication is both intrusive
and risky. 59 The APA believes there is significant evidence to
support the conclusion that psychotropic medication is both intrusive and risky. 60 In contrast, psychiatry, while acknowledging
the risks, argues that antipsychotic medication is not as intrusive
or as potentially dangerous as psychology argues. 6 ' Despite the
plethora of research on this topic, 6 2 it is clear that more definitive,
methodologically sound research, performed by psychopharmacologists, physicians, and social scientists, is still needed.
I find the second issue more intriguing from the perspective
of law and social science. The exercise of self-determination is
dependent on a presumption or a finding that the person exercising that right is competent. 63 The problem is that there has never
been a satisfactory consensus as to the definition of compe57. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n at 22, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599) (panel may be composed of
"professionals who are not employees of the prison, and who represent a variety
of disciplines.").
58. See Winick, supra note 3, at 21.
59. For a discussion of the extent of intrusiveness and riskiness of psychotropic drugs, see supra note 21.
60. For a listing of briefs in which the APA has asserted this position, see
supra note 53.
61. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychiatric Ass'n, Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599).
62. For a discussion of the research on antipsychotic medication, see supra
note 21.
63. Winick, supra note 3, at 21. (law generally treats competency as prerequisite to ability to provide informed consent).
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tence. 6 4 First, standards for determining competence change
with the context in which it is considered. 65 For example, the
legal system has developed somewhat dissimilar rules for determining competency of adults to stand trial, to plead guilty, to be
executed, to make enforceable contracts, to execute a will, or to
refuse medical treatment. 6 6 To the federal court of appeals that
decided Charters, however, the distinction between competence to
stand trial and competence to make health care decisions is a difference "of such subtlety and complexity as to tax perception by
67
the most skilled medical or psychiatric professionals."Although this is not my own belief, it certainly represents an empirical assertion that can, and should, be tested.
Second, a judgment that a person is incompetent typically
permits others to exercise the right of informed decisionmaking
that would otherwise be left to the patient. 6 8 As Macklin & Sherwin stated, "[n]eglecting to seek informed consent ...indicates a
... failure to recognize autonomy and hence, the humanity of the
[individual]." 69 As a result of the numerous implications, how one
64. Alan M. Tepper & Amiram Elwork, Competence to Consent to Treatment As a
Psycholegal Construct, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 205 (1984).
65. Compare Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment,
134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977) (describing rationality and reasonableness as
included in tests of competency to consent to treatment) with James R.P. Ogloff
et al., Competencies in the Criminal Process, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW
343 (D. K. Kagehiro & W. S. Laufer eds., 1992) (articulating competency standards for various stages of criminal justice process).
66. See, e.g., Ogloff et al., supra note 65 (articulating disparate standards of
competency to stand trial, plead guilty, sustain execution and waive counsel).
67. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 1988). The court
minimized the importance of requiring competency in the first place. Id. Instead of seeing competency as a barrier to the forcible administration of drugs,
the Fourth Circuit instead viewed competency as "properly treated as simply
another factor in the ultimate medical decision to administer the medication involuntarily." Id. at 311-12.
Moreover, the court's minimization of the difference between competence
to stand trial and competence to make decisions about one's medical treatment,
although perhaps rhetorically sonorous, is completely in error. In fact, the
mental health professions have, for the last 15 years or so, been working to define the differences between various forms of competencies. See, e.g., Ogloff,
supra note 65 (describing various standards for competence in different criminal
situations); Roth, supra note 65 (describing five basic tests of competency); see
also Stephen J. Anderer, A Alodelfor DeterminingCompetency in GuardianshipProceedings, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW RPTR. 107 (1990) (proposing functional analysis to determine specific competencies in elderly persons being
considered for guardianship).
68. See Winick, supra note 3, at 16-17.
69. Ruth Macklin & Susan Sherwin, Experimenting On Human Subjects: Philosophical Perspectives, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 434, 443 (1975).
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defines competency assumes great significance. 70
One way to determine competence is to look at the outcome
of a decision. 7 ' If the decision is perceived as reasonable, then
the patient is considered competent to make the treatment decision. 72 Thus, no matter how delusional or otherwise crazy the
basis on which the decision was made, the decision to accept
psychotropic medication would be deemed competent. 73 Conversely, no matter how rational the process used to decide to refuse such medication, a person diagnosed as mentally ill and
judged by a psychiatrist as in need of medication, who does refuse, would be deemed incompetent.7 4 For example, in Charters,
the state psychiatrist testified that her finding of incompetence
was not based on Charters' inability to respond in an appropriate
way or on his expression of non sequiturs. 75 Instead, she found
Charters incompetent because he refused treatment that she con76
sidered to be demonstrably in his interest.
Alternatively, one can define competence not on the basis of
outcome, but on the basis of process. 7 7 Under this model, if the
cognitive steps one takes in arriving at the decision are deemed
reasonable, then the decision, whatever it is, will be deemed competent. 78 Conversely, if the patient agrees to take medication on
a basis that is considered unreasonable, for example, when a patient states, "it will make me Jesus," the person will be deemed
incompetent. 79 Of course, courts will rarely be confronted by the
competency decision in this second instance because, as long as
the patient complies with the physician's treatment plan, it is unlikely that the physician will challenge the decision. 80 However,
70. See Loretta M. Kopelman, On the Evaluative Nature of Competency and CaINT'LJ. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 309 (1990) (asserting that values
are necessary part of determinations of competency and capacity).
71. For exposition regarding the outcome method of determining competency, see Roth, supra note 65, at 281. See also Paul R. Friedman, Legal Regulation
of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 39, 77
(1975).
72. See Roth, supra note 65, at 281.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 1988).
76. Id.
77. See Roth, supra note 65, at 281.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. In Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990), it was the patient who
later challenged his own decision and that of the psychiatrists who admitted him.
Id. at 114-15. In questioning the cognitive capacity of the patient to decide
whether to admit himself to the hospital, the Court may be said to have indicated
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like the first definition, the process-based definition of competency places a great deal of emphasis on the judgment by an observer of the perceived reasonableness of the patient.8s These
definitions, therefore, can be considered paternalistic or "best interest" perspectives that fail to consider mental patients' equally
important, or even overriding interests in autonomy, self-determination and bodily integrity.
A third way to define competence is to view it as the capacity
to comprehend the objectively disclosed risks and benefits of a proposed treatment and to indicate a decision about whether the individual wishes to undergo the proposed treatment.8 2 Judgment
of the observer here is a great deal more limited.8 3 Reasonableness as to process or outcome is not considered. Instead, the
only questions to be answered are whether the person can assimilate the risks and benefits and whether the person can make a
84
decision.
It would be my guess that if this third option were used, more
people would be accorded the dignity of self-determination.
However, this is also an empirical question and social scientists
have yet to focus on definitions of competence and what real-life
differential effects they would yield, if any. This is a fertile field
for future investigation that remains unharvested.
Finally, although some research has been done on the effects
of giving mental patients the right to refuse antipsychotic medication, we know very little about the effects this would have on hospital administration, and even less about effects on the doctorpatient relationship. 8 5 Two psychiatrists, Appelbaum, and Lidz
at least an implied preference for this second definition of competence. See id. at
116-17.
81. See G. P. Lippert & D. E. Stewart, The Psychiatrist's Role in Determining
Competency to Consent in the GeneralHospital, 33 CANADIANJ. PSYCHIATRY 250 (1988)
(describing situations in which doctors are called on to assess competency).
82. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 65, at 281.
83. Because the test evaluates the ability of the subject to comprehend, this
can be assessed by objective measures of comprehension, thus leaving less room
for the discretion of the evaluator. See Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum,
Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally Ill Patients'Abilitiesto Understand Informed Consent Disclosuresfor Medication: PreliminaryData, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 337 (1991) (applying
objective assessment of patients' ability to comprehend risks and benefits of
medication).
84. See Roth supra note 65, at 281.
85. There are those who claim that this would cause tremendous difficulties
for administrators of hospitals, as they could not at any time predict patient refusal rates, related disruptive behavior, or the need for additional staff. Very
little research on the impact of various competency criteria has been attempted.
See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychnotic Medi-
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and their attorney-collaborator, Meisel, have encapsulated the
conflict as follows:
Patient's refusal[s] are among the most difficult situations physicians must handle. They must come to grips
with the limits on their authority to order interventions
and on their power singlehandedly to combat disease
and restore health. Even physicians who are generally
supportive of the idea of informed consent may balk at
its implications when patients refuse care physicians believe to be highly beneficial. The reality, however, is that
no human being is omnipotent. We must all face real
limitations on our power to pursue our goals and advance our values. Having done what they can to insure
informed decision making by patients who are refusing
treatment . . . physicians can do no more. Their moral
and legal obligations have been fulfilled. If in consequence patients are not treated precisely the way their
physicians would have desired, that is the price we pay as
86
a society for supporting individual freedom of choice.
It would be intriguing to pursue more fully the consequences to
health care, patient treatment, and patient's rights of adopting
the position of these authors.
There is one consequence of a self-deterministic position
that deserves mention. While it may be obvious, the point at least
needs to be underscored. The more one argues for autonomy in
adults, particularly the mentally disabled, the more accountability
one must vest in these populations. I abhor the death penalty
under any circumstances and believe it serves no justified societal
purpose. Nevertheless, I am in essential agreement with the
Supreme Court's judgment in Penry v. Lynaugh,8 7 that the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause should not be
used as an absolute bar to the death penalty with mentally retarded defendants who murder, as long the Supreme Court concations: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 418 (1988) ("Rather
than the anticipated epidemic of refusals, studies of clinically significant refusals
show that only 1 - 5% will be refusers.").
86. PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 201-02 (1987). See also Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth,
Involuntary Treatment in Medicine and Psychiatry, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 202 (1984)
(asserting that motivations of involuntary treatment, though not unique to psychiatry, are rooted more in medical paternalism than in desire to exert social
control).
87. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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tinues to hold that the death penalty is, in some circumstances, a
constitutional punishment.8 8
In Penry, the Court found it unconstitutional to omit instructions to the jury that it could consider a defendant's mental impairment as a possibly mitigating factor during the penalty phase
of a homicide prosecution.8 9 At the same time, however, the
court rejected the use of mental age as an absolute barrier to execution, 90 stating that "reliance on mental age to measure the capabilities of a retarded person for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment could have a disempowering effect if applied in other
areas of the law." 9 ' The Court pointed out that if the death penalty could be barred on the basis of mental age alone, "a mildly
mentally retarded person could [also] be denied the opportunity
to enter into contracts or to marry by virtue of the fact that he had
a 'mental age' of a young child." 9 2 As dispiriting as the Penry decision may be to the protectors of mentally impaired persons, it
does provide the ever-important reminder that beneficence mod88. See id. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty
itself is not per se "cruel and unusual punishment").
89. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). The defendant in Penry, a 22 year
old parolee with a mental age estimated at six and a half, admitted to, and was
convicted of, the murder of a woman who was "brutally raped, beaten, and
stabbed with a pair of scissors in her home." Id. at 307. At the sentencing phase
of the trial, the Texas state court permitted imposition of the death penalty upon
the jury's answering "yes" to the following three interrogatories:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if
any, by the deceased.
Id. at 310.
Defense counsel's objections to these instructions included, inter alia, that
they "failed to 'authorize a discretionary grant of mercy based upon the existence of mitigating circumstances' " and "failed to instruct the jury that it may
take into consideration all of the evidence whether aggravating or mitigating in
nature." Id. at 311.
After denial of relief by both the district court, as well as the Fifth Circuit,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the sentencing court's failure to instruct and allow the jury to consider defendant's mental retardation as
mitigating his culpability denied defendant protection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 328.
90. Id. at 339-40. The Court in fact remanded the case for resentencing in
order to allow a jury to consider the death penalty while at the same time considering the mitigating effects of defendant's mental retardation. Id. at 340.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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els, although seeking to protect vulnerable populations in one situation, may have the unintended effect of undercutting
93
independence and self-determination in others.
The same principle that applies to the mentally handicapped
applies as well to children. 94 The APA did not enter an amicus
brief in Thompson v. Oklahoma 9 5 nor in Stanford v. Kentucky, 96 two

recent cases concerning the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the execution of fifteen and seventeen year-olds, respectively. 97 As was true with the mentally retarded, the Court in
Stanford refused to find that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause absolutely banned the death penalty for these minors. 98
Putting aside the fact that one must question the decency of any
society that permits the execution of any one of us, 99 but particularly minors and the mentally disabled, it does seem reasonable to
argue that each person must be individually assessed regarding
93. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (holding voluntary
assent of mental patient to treatment void if patient deemed incapable of consent); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (holding that to protect women
because of their capacity for bearing children adversely contributed to discrimination against women in the workplace). But see, e.g., International Union, UAW
v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (excluding women with child-bearing capacity from lead-exposed jobs creates facial classification based on gender
and explicitly discriminates against women on basis of sex).
94. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished.
Some Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182 (1989).
95. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
96. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
97. In Thompson, the fifteen year-old defendant participated in the brutal
murder of his brother-in-law, who was shot in his throat and chest, cut in the
abdomen, chained to a concrete block and thrown into a river, where the body
remained for four weeks. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 819. Defendant's counsel, as
well as several amici, urged the Court to " 'draw a line' that would prohibit the
execution of any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense."
Id. at 838. The Court, however, stated that the case could be decided without
addressing the 18-year-old cutoff point. Id. In its place, the Court created a 16year-old cutoff, stating that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her
offense." Id.
The Court did address the 18-year-old cutoff in Stanford, where the respective defendants were 17 years, 4 months and 16 years, 6 months at the time of
the crimes. 492 U.S. at 365-66. There, the Court determined that the execution
of 16 and 17 year-olds would not violate the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society" and thus declined to hold these executions unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 379-80 (emphasis
omitted).
98. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379-90 (1989). The Court actually
went so far as to say that execution of 16 and 17 year-olds is not cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
99. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1981) (discussing possibility of mistake in inflicting death

penalty and lack of standards in sentencing).
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his or her culpability or responsibility. This permits us to argue
with equal vigor that there should be no conclusive presumption
that all mentally handicapped people or all children are incapable
of making decisions regarding their own health care or other lifeimportant matters.
My argument with the Supreme Court is that, when it comes
to children, the Court is at best ignorant and at the worst, fraudulent and duplicitous. I am willing to settle, however, for the proposition that it is confused and unprincipled. The child advocacy
movement has been one of the more forceful and publicized in
recent history.10 0 It has focused primarily on the right of children
to be protected from the choices or misconduct of others.' 0 1 This
child-protection function is best exemplified by the passage of
10 2
child abuse reporting statutes in all American jurisdictions.
Children remain, however, like Ralph Ellison's hero, Invisible
Persons whose views are infrequently invoked and whose wishes
are rarely controlling. 0 3 Children's right to choose "is not
10 4
viewed as presently existing... but as maturing in the future."'
Parents as custodians, the state as protector, and advocates who
seek to act in what they perceive to be the best interests of children represent them only in the sense of taking care of another.
They are acting merely "in behalf of," that is, in the interest of, or
for the benefit of, another. 10 5 Those who act "in behalf of" are
100. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY
(1989) (legal text, central question: Who decides for children?);

AND THE STATE

Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43

HARV. EDUC. REV.

487 (1973) (under

law, children are generally considered incapable of knowing what is in their best
interest); Drive for the Rights of Children, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 5,
1974, at 42 (describing movement to extend legal rights afforded adults to children); Gregory's Divorce, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1992, at 312 (Florida court allows
12-year-old boy to "divorce" his parents and be adopted by foster parents-first
time child allowed to bring legal action in his own right).
101. For a discussion of more recent advances in the child advocacy movement, see infra notes 102, 108.

102.

CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, OFFICE OF HUMAN

DEV. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A SHARED COMMUNITY CONCERN 10 (1989).

"Today, every state, [including] the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands [has] child abuse reporting laws." Id.

103.

RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN

(1947); see also Marjorie R. Freiman,

Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse Statutes, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243 (1982) (detailing development of child abuse statutes
and suggesting additional prevention strategies).
104. Beth Amy Hirschberg, Who Speaks for the Child and What Are His Rights?:
A Proposed Standard For Evaluation, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 217, 225 (1980).

105. See HANNAH PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 126-27 (1967)
(discussing difference between acting "in behalf of" and "on behalf of").
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under no obligation to consult with those they take care of or to
abide by their wishes.' 0 6 Such a role is different from acting "on
behalf of," which connotes that the advocate is acting on the part
of, or as the one represented might act.' 0 7 If we are genuinely to
urge the expanded rights of children, such advocacy must include
the right of children to full-fledged participation in the decisionmaking process when their significant interests and future hang in
08
the balance. '
Whether children will ever exercise the independent right to
self-determination depends a great deal on how the Supreme
Court allocates power among parents, children, and the various
arms of federal and state government. In this regard, the future
does not look good for autonomy. The Court has consistently
held the view, as Justice Powell reiterated in Bellotti v. Baird,10 9
that "[s]tates validly may limit the freedom of children to choose
for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices
with potentially serious consequences." ' "10 That power, he said,
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. The ability of minors to make informed judgements on such matters,
at least as assessed by courts, is vastly underestimated. See, e.g., Patricia I. Carter
& Janet S. St. Lawrence, Adolescents' Competency to Make Informed Birth Control and
Pregnancy Decisions: An Interfacefor Psychology and Law, 3 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 309
(1985) (proposing research design to study competency of adolescent to make
informed decisions about pregnancy issues); Melvin J. Guyer, Developmental
Rights to Privacy and Independent Decision-Making, 21 J. AM. ACADEMY CHILD PSYCHIATRY 298 (1982) (asserting that parents could do more to foster indepedent
decision making abilities and courts should do more to recognize them); Jeffrey
C. Savitsky & Deborah Karras, Competency to Stand TrialAmongAdolescents, 19 ADOLESCENCE 349 (1984) (demonstrating progressive increase in competency to
stand trial throughout adolescence); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The
Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 1589 (1982) (finding no difference between 14 year-olds and
adults on one measure of competency to consent to treatment); Bruce Ambuel &
Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 129 (1992) (finding adolescents
who considered abortion no less competent than legal adults to make decisions);
Donald N. Bersoff, Children as Participantsin PsychoeducationalAssesment, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCY TO CONSENT

149 (Gary Melton et al. eds., 1983) (asserting

adolescents no less competent as decision makers compared to adults).
109. 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
110. Id. Bellotti involved a question as to the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that required pregnant minors to obtain consent from both of
their parents in order to procure an abortion. Id. at 625. The statute also provided that if either the parent or designated guardian refused to consent, such
consent could be "obtained by order of a judge.., for good cause shown." Id.
The Court struck down the statute because it deemed unconstitutional the
blanket requirement that all minors first check with their parents before an abortion, and stated that it felt that the appropriate procedure would be to allow the
minor to circumvent that step and "go directly to a court without first consulting

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 6 [1992], Art. 2

1590

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 1569

was "grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them.""' Although acknowledging that
children have constitutional rights and that the requirement of
veto-like parental consent in all minor abortion cases unduly
abridged those constitutional rights, Justice Powell asserted that
"the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for chilsympathy,
dren's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern ....
and . . . paternal attention.' " 112 In Parham v. J.R., 1 3 then Chief
Justice Burger, announcing for the Court that minors did not
have the right to a precommitment hearing when parents seek
their admission to a hospital for treatment of behavioral disorders, repeated the Court's belief that "[m]ost children, even in
adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or
treatment." ' " 4 "Parents," he stated, "can and must make those
judgments."' 15
Thus, the law considers children generally incapable of
knowing and deciding what is best for themselves. In their salutary goal to protect families from unreasonable state interference
and in a more questionable desire to protect children from immature and potentially harmful autonomous decisions, courts have
presumed that parents, as preferred caregivers, are competent to
represent their children's interests and when parents fail, that the
State is." 1 6 Although the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children has strong foundations in tradition and in the
Constitution's preference for minimal state interference in family
or notifying her parents." Id. at 647. The Court, however, stopped short of
permitting a minor to obtain an abortion without either parental or judicial
oversight. See id. at 651.
111. Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
112. Id. (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion)). The Court enumerated "three reasons justifying the conclusion
that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults:
the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in
an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing." Id. at 634.
113. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
114. Id. at 603. But see Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 108 (finding that
children are capable of making mature and informed decisions regarding their
health); Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 108 (finding that adolescents who considered abortion appeared as competent as adults).
115. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 (1979).
116. See id. at 602-03 ("[P]ages of human experience.., teach that parents
generally . . . act in the child's best interests.").
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life, that right, as a HarvardLaw Review article pointed out a decade ago, "is nevertheless unusual among constitutional rights in
that it protects the ability to control another person."'1 17 Ordinarily, constitutional rights do not protect an individual's power to
18
control someone else.'
The Court's solicitude for protecting children turns out, in
reality, to be a means for restricting them or treating them more
onerously than adults. For example, while the Court has held
that the physical discipline of adult prisoners violates the Eighth
Amendment, it has nonetheless ruled that corporal punishment
of school children is not so barred. 1 9 Additionally, while the
Court has deemed pretrial detention for adults to raise significant
constitutional issues, it has nonetheless justified restraint of juvenile suspects on the basis of perceived immaturity, stating that
"[c]hildren, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to
take care of themselves."' 120 In educational settings, the Court
has permitted school officials to restrict the conduct of students
that would not be permitted in the case of adults. In Bethel School
District v. Fraser,12 1 the Court upheld the right of school officials to
discipline a high school student for presenting a speech to his
contemporaries in support of a fellow student's candidacy for student elective office which, while not explicitly obscene, was sexu117. 93

HARV.

L.

REV.

1156, 1353 (1980).

118. Id.
119. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). For further discussion
of Ingraham, see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
120. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). Schall involved a challenge
to a New York statute which authorized pretrial detention of an accused juvenile
delinquent upon a finding of "serious risk" that the child "may before the return
date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime."
Id. at 255 (quoting Far. Ct. Act, N.Y. Jud. Law § 320.5(3) (McKinney 1983)).
Suit was brought on behalf of all juveniles detained pursuant to the provision.
Id. at 255-56. The district court struck down the provision as "permitting detention without due process of law." Id. at 256. The Second Circuit affirmed, opining that "the detention period serves as punishment imposed without proof of
guilt established according to the requisite constitutional standard." Id. (quoting Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1982)). Reversing, the
Supreme Court concluded that the statute "serves a legitimate state objective,
and that the procedural protections afforded pretrial detainees by the New York
statute satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id. at 256-57.
Although the Court stated that it viewed the juveniles' interest in freedom
as "undoubtedly substantial," the Court stated that "juveniles, unlike adults, are
always in some form of custody," and, as such, could be "subordinated to the
State's 'parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child.' " Id. at 265 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
121. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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ally metaphoric.' 22
Virtually trumpeting its willingness to
denigrate the rights of minors compared to adults, the Court
stated that "simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker
considers a political point, [it does not follow] that the same latitude must be permitted to children."' 23 Furthermore, in New
Jersey v. T.L.O.,124 the Court permitted searches and seizures of
students' property without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than on the higher standard of probable
25
cause afforded adult suspects.'
To end this litany, I cannot let go unnoticed that on the same
day in 1979 that the Court in Parham decided that the Constitu122. The speech was as follows:
"I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his
shirt, his character is firm-but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the

students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhilman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If
necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack
things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he
succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each
and every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be."
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting student's speech).
123. Id. at 682. It is noteworthy that the Court was willing to so find while
at the same time echoing, albeit somewhat hollowly, that "students do not 'shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.'" Id. at 3163 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
124. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
125. Id. at 345. In T.L.O., a student was caught smoking in the school lavatory and was reported to the principal. Id. at 328. Although her compatriate
admitted to smoking, T.L.O. denied it, and the principal demanded to see her
purse, where he found not only cigarettes, but also cigarette rolling papers. Id.
Because "[iun his experience .... [rolling papers were] closely associated with
the use of marijuana," he became suspicious and examined the purse further,
finding "a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a
substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared to
be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters that implicated
T.L.O. in mariuana dealing." Id.
Although the Supreme Court stated that "the [Constitution] protects the
rights of students against encroachment by public school officials," id. at 334,
and noted that "a search of a child's person or of a closed purse or other bag
carried on her person ... is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy," id.at 339 (footnote omitted), the Court nonetheless proceeded to hold that "accomodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren
with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain
order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that
searches be based on probable cause." d. at 341. Rather, the court simply permitted the search as long as the rather vague criteria of "reasonableness, under
all the circumstances," was met. Id.
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tion did not require hearings for children when placed in mental
hospitals against their will because they were too immature to
1
make independent decisions, 126 it decided Fare v. Michael C. 27
In that case, a sixteen year old boy was being questioned by the
police. 128 After his request to see his probation officer was refused, the boy implicated himself in a murder. 29 The Court held
that the boy waived his right to remain silent under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 30 Although there was evidence that
Michael was crying during the interrogation and had relatively little schooling,' 3 ' the Court asserted that he waived his constitutional rights knowingly and intelligently. 132 As the Court said,
"[t]here [was] no indication that he was of insufficient intelligence
to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be."' 33 In light of Michael C. and
the juvenile death penalty cases, 134 to a majority of the Supreme
Court, when children commit crimes they magically assume the
decisionmaking ability and personal culpability of adults; when
they are about to be placed in a mental hospital or seek to secure
an abortion without parental or state involvement, they are but
immature, unthinking children who must rely on their parents,
35
judgment as to what is in their best interest.
126. For a further discussion of Parham, see supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
127. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
128. Id. at 710.
129. Id. at 711.
130. Id. at 728. In Michael C., the defendant was brought in for questioning
on the basis of his, and his vehicle's, similarity to a description of an individual
and an vehicle used in a crime. Id. at 709. The tape-recorded interrogation of
Michael C. revealed that the officers explained to the defendant his Miranda
rights and then asked if he understood them, to which he answered affirmatively.
Id. at 710. When asked whether he wanted to waive his rights and talk to the
officers "about this murder," defendant first feigned lack of knowledge and then
inquired as to whether he could have his probation officer present. Id. The
officers stated that they would not call the probation officer that night and again
asked if defendant was willing to waive his rights and discuss the murder. Id. at
711. The defendant agreed and provided self-incriminating statements and
sketches. Id. at 710-11.
131. Id. at 733 (Powell J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 728.
133. Id. at 726.
134. For a more complete discussion ofjuvenile death cases, see supra notes
95-99 and accompanying text.
135. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502 (1990)
(upholding requirement of parental notification for adolescent abortion). For a
more complete discussion of Akron, see infra note 145 and accompanying text.
See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct.
2791 (1992).
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I, of course, am not the first or only concerned complainer
about this state of affairs. Such scholars interested in law and social science as Melton, Mnookin, Weithorn, and Wrightsman have
noted their concern.13 6 What is particularly galling to me, as well
as others, is that the Court justifies its differential treatment of
children on the unsupported assumptions that all children are peculiarly vulnerable, are unable to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and need the control and guidance of
their parents. 3 7 While these assumptions may be correct as to
infants and elementary school children, it is very much open to
doubt whether it is true about adolescents. 3 8 At the very least,
these assumptions are empirically testable hypotheses. And, in
the main, the existing data do not support these hypotheses rela39
tive to adolescents.m
In amicus briefs it submitted in Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 140 and in
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 14 1 two cases regarding minors' right to abortions, the APA argued that psychological theory and sound research about cognitive, social and moral development strongly
support the conclusion that most adolescents are competent to
make informed decisions. 42 The data do not support the Court's
presumption that adolescents typically lack the capacity to make
sound health care decisions, including decisions about abortions.' 43 In addition, the evidence does not support the proposi136. See, e.g., Mnookin supra note 100; Weithorn supra note 108; see also
NANCY WALKER & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WITNESS: LEGAL ISSUES AND DILEMMAS (1991) (reviewing social science research relating to children's competency and credibility in court); LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTMAN,
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM, 344-57 (2d ed. 1991).
137. Ignoring methodologically sound social science research, the Court
has based its opinions on such unreliable sources as the "pages of human experience." Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). For critiques of the Court's
reliance on common human experience, see Judicial Deference, supra note 20;
Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense"
and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990); Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton,
PrecedentialValue ofJudicialNotice of Social Facts: Parhamas an Example, 22J. FAM. L.
633, 647 (1983-84).
138. See, e.g., Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 108.
139. See id.
140. 484 U.S. 171 (1987).
141. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
142. See Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological Association, Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (No. 85-673).
143. See Howard S. Adelman et al., Competence of Minors to Understand, Evaluate, and Communicate About Their PsychoeducationalProblems, 16 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY
426, 433 (1985) ("[T]he behavior of the majority reflected a level of competence
that adds support to the body of literature suggesting that many minors can
effectively participate in treatment decisions."); Donald N. Bersoff, Children as
Research Subjects: Problems of Competency and Consent, in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
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tion that parental involvement in such decisions fosters
productive intrafamily communication or ensures a more compe44
tent decision.'
Did the Supreme Court listen to such evidence? The answer,
not unexpected given its decisions in the 1980s, was decidedly
"No". In Hodgson, and its companion case, Ohio v. Akron Centerfor
Reproductive Health,' 4 5 decided on the same day in June 1990, the
Court upheld the right of the State to require prior notification to
parents before a physician can perform an abortion on unmarried, unemancipated young women below eighteen years of
age. 146 The Court held these same restrictions unconstitutional
186, 211 (J. Henning ed., 1982) ("Children are capable of making... decisions
no less disastrously than adults."); Lucy Rau Ferguson, The Competence and Freedom of Children to Make Choices Regarding Participationin Research: A Statement, 34 J.
Soc. ISSUES 114, 120 (Spring, 1978) ("All the available evidence on cognitive
development and the growth of intellectual abilities suggests that the adolescent's capacity for exercising independent judgement is limited, as compared to
the adult's, only by a lack of relevant experience and information." (emphasis added));
Thomas Grisso,Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An EmpiricalAnalysis,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980) (discussing issue of juveniles' waiver of Miranda
rights); Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 412, 423 (1978) (noting little evidence
that minors age 15 and above are as a group any less competent); Catharine C.
Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes Over Grades Seven to Twelve and
Policy Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538, 541 (1981) ("There is a significant increase, with grade level, in spontaneous mention of future consequences or implications of decisions."); Catharine C. Lewis, Minors' Competence to Consent to
Abortion, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 84, 87 (1987) ("Minors may equal adults in their
competence to reason about decisions."); Lois A. Weithorn, Children's Capacities
in Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE LAW 25 (N. Repucci &
Assoc. eds., 1984) (reviewing various studies done on the subject); Ambuel &
Rappaport, supra note 108.
144. See Clay V. Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-PeerCross-Pressures, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 385 (1963) (finding that responses of adolscents to peer pressure
is function of content of alternatives); Freddie Clary, Minor Women ObtainingAbortions: A Study of ParentalNotification in a Metropolitan Area, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
283 (1982) (examining reasons minors choose not to notify parents of planned
abortion); Raye Hudson Rosen, Adolescent Pregnancy Decision-Making: Are Parents
Important?, 15 ADOLESCENCE 43 (1980) (examining extent to which teenagers involve their parents in decision making process concerning unwanted
pregnancies); Aida Torres et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use
of Family Planningand Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284 (1980) (examining parental consent and notification policies adopted by abortion and family
planning programs).
145. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
146. In Hodgson, the regulation at issue was a Minnesota statute described
by the Court as follows:
[N]o abortion shall be performed on a woman under 18 years of age
until at least 48 hours after both of her parents have been notified. In
subdivisions 2-4 of the statute the notice is mandatory unless (1) the
attending physician certifies that an immediate abortion is necessary to
prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient time to provide the
required notice; (2) both of her parents have consented in writing; or
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as to adults in 1983.147 In a highly fragmented opinion, Justice
Stevens, speaking for the majority in Hodgson, agreed that the
"Is]tate has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its
young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights

wisely." 148
As noted, this result was not unexpected. To most of the
Supreme Court, the "pages of human experience,"'' 49 at least as
lived by its members, no matter how wrong, often is far more persuasive than data gleaned from methodologically sound research.
As I have noted in a 1986 article in Law & Human Behavior,' 50 the
(3) the woman declares that she is a victim of parental abuse or neglect,
in which event notice of her declaration must be given to the proper
authorities... Subdivision 6 of the same statute provides that if a court
enjoins the enforcement of subdivision 2, the same notice requirement
shall be effective unless the pregnant woman obtains a court order permitting the abortion to proceed.

497 U.S. at 505.
The statute at issue in Akron set conditions on abortions for minors as
follows:
First, a physician may perform an abortion if he provides "at least
twenty-four hours actual notice, in person or by telephone," to one of
the women's parents (or her guardian or custodian) of his intention to
perform the abortion. The physician, as an alternative, may notify a
minor's adult brother, sister, stepparent, or grandparent, if the minor
and the other relative each file an affidavit in the juvenile court stating
that the minor fears physical, sexual, or severe emotional abuse from
one of her parents. If the physician cannot give the notice "after a reasonable effort," he may perform the abortion after "at least forty-eight
hours constructive notice" by both ordinary and certified mail. Second,
a physician may perform an abortion on the minor if one of her parents
(or her guardian or custodian) has consented to the abortion in writing.
The third and fourth circumstances depend on ajudicial procedure
that allows a minor to bypass the notice and consent provisions just
described. The statute allows a physician to perform an abortion without notifying one of the minor's parents or receiving the parent's consent if a juvenile court issues an order authorizing the minor to
consent, or if ajuvienile court or court of appeals, by its inactions, provides constructive authorization for the minor to consent.

497 U.S. at 505.
147. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983).
148. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 417. The Court revisited the issue in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992). The
Court addressed this issue in three short paragraphs, merely reiterating its views
in previous cases and without citing new social science evidence supporting earlier research findings that older adolescents have the decisionmaking capabilities
of average adults. Id.
149. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
150. Donald N. Bersoff, Psychologists and the Judicial System, 10 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 151 (1986) (presenting history of use of social science data and psychological experts in legal system).
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relationship between law and social science is less than perfect.
"Like an insensitive scoundrel involved with an attractive but fundamentally irksome lover who too much wants to be courted, the

judiciary shamelessly uses the social sciences."' 151 Courts cite the
results of psychological research when they believe it will enhance
the elegance of their opinions, as in the most oft-cited example of
Brown v. Board of Education,152 but empiricism is readily discarded
when more traditional legally acceptable bases for decisionmaking are available.
Illustrative examples are legion, but, in the interests of space,
I will select but a few. In 1968. the Supreme Court in Witherspoon
v. Illinois held the cited social science research too "tentative and
fragmentary" to be useful.' 53 The results from three then extant
studies showed that juries from whom individuals with scruples
against the death penalty were excluded were prone to support
the prosecution. 1 54 The Court left open the possibility it would
151. Id. at 155-56.
152. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court cited the work of psychologist Kenneth Clark to support the finding that state-sanctioned segregation instills a debilitating sense of inferiority in black children. Id. at 494 (citing K.B.
Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury
White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950)).
153. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
154. Id. at 517. The "death-qualification" of the jury in Witherspoon occurred pursuant to an Illinois statute that provided: "Intrials for murder it shall
be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he
has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to
the same." Id. at 512 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 743 (1959)).
In accordance with this statute, the trial court permitted the dismissal of 47
consecutive potential jurors on grounds that they were against the death penalty
and could thus not be relied upon to find the defendant guilty if they knew the
sentence would be the death sentence. Id. at 512-13. Defense counsel argued
that
such a jury, unlike one chosen at random from a cross-section of the
community, must necessarily be biased in favor of conviction, for the
kind of juror who would be unperturbed by the prospect of sending a
man to his death ...is the kind ofjuror who would too readily ignore
the presumption of the defendant's innocence, accept the prosecution's
version of the facts, and return a verdict of guilt.
Id. at 516-17.
The court considered the three studies cited by defendant, but found them
unpersuasive, concluding that "[i]n light of the presently available information,
we are not prepared to announce a per se constitutional rule requiring the reversal of every conviction returned by a jury selected as this one was." Id. at 518.
The three studies were, W.C. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (unpublished manuscript, University of Texas, 1964 cited in
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517 n.10); F.J. Goldberg, Attitude Toward Capital Punishment and Behavior as a Juro in Simulated Capital Case (unpublished manuscript, Morehouse College, undated cited in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517 n.10);
H. Zeisel, Some Insights Into the Operation of Criminal Juries 42 (Confidential
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rule differently if further research more clearly demonstrated that
these death-qualified juries were prosecution prone. 55
Social scientists took the Court's invitation seriously and produced a great deal of what appeared to be legally relevant, methodologically sound research on the issue. 156 Much of that
research was originally published or reviewed in a special issue of
Law and Human Behavior, the official journal of the American Psychology-Law Society, in 1984. 57 It was presented to the Court in
1985, in a carefully crafted amicus brief by the APA in Lockhart v.
McCree. 158

First Draft, University of Chicago, November 1957 cited in Witherspoon, 391 U.S.
at 517 n.10).
155. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517 n.ll.
156. See, e.g., Robert M. Berry, Death Qualification and the "Fireside Induction,"
5 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 1, 37 (1982) (concluding death-qualified juries "unconstitutionally" prone to convict); Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death
Qualificationon Jurors' Predispositionto Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 L. &
HuM. BEHAV. 53 (1984) (study finding death qualified jury members significantly
more likely than excluded jurors to vote guilty, both on initial ballot and after
hours deliberation in twelve person juries); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control. Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984) (death-qualified jurors more prone to "favor" prosecution's point of view, to mistrust criminal defendants, to take punitive approach
towards offenders, and to be more concerned with crime control than due process); Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1980) (arguing
against Witherspoon); Faye Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital
Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970) (death-qualified jury more likely to find defendant guilty); Craig Haney, Examining Death Qualification, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
133 (1984) (discussing "process effects" of death qualification); Craig Haney, On
the Selection of CapitalJuries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-QualificationProcess, 8 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984) ("Death-qualification" may bias capital juries by altering composition ofjury group and by exposing jury to unusual and suggestive
legal process); Craig Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512 (1980) (study finding death-qualified
juries prone towards conviction); George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a
"Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567
(1971) (research study showing death-qualified jury more likely to convict); Walter F. Oberer, Does Disqualificationof Jurorsfor Scruples Against Capital Punishment
Constitute Denial of FairTrial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 545 (1961) (arguing for change in death-qualified jury system); Walter C. Thompson et al., Death
Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The TranslationofAttitudes into Verdicts, 8 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984) ("Attitudes toward the death penalty are consistently
predictive of juror's verdicts in criminal trials."); Welsh S. White, The Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-QualifiedJuries, 58 CORNELL L. REV.
1176 (1973) (arguing convictions by death-qualified juries are constitutionally
invalid).
157. See Craig Haney, Editor's Introduction, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1984) (introducing special edition focusing on characteristics and functioning of capital
jury).
158. 476 U.S. 162 (1986). Lockhart also involved the "death-qualification"
of ajury by removal of potential jurors who claimed that they could not vote for
the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 166. In this case, both the Federal
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I was the nominal drafter of the brief, along with my colleague David Ogden who had clerked for Justice Blackmun. We
were aided immeasurably by the participation of five social psychologists directly involved in legal issues-John Monahan,
Phoebe Ellsworth, Michael Saks, Reid Hastie, and Craig Haney.
Although the dissent was impressed with the social science evidence, calling it "overwhelming,"' t59 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for the majority, found "several serious flaws" in the social science evidence introduced by the defendant, relied on by
lower courts, and described in the APA's amicus brief.' 60 It was a
methodological critique worthy of a hostile dissertation chairman. 16 ' The detail of the critique was particularly ironic given
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit agreed
that there was "substantial evidentiary support ...that the removal for cause of
'Witherspoon-excludables' resulted in 'conviction prone' juries [in violation of defendant's] constitutional right to a jury selected from a fair cross section of the
community." Id. at 168 (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir.
1985) (en banc)).
159. Id. at 184 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160, Id. at 168.
161. Justice Rehnquist's logic in refuting the entirety of the social science
evidence does not withstand even casual scrutiny. With a fine-toothed comb,
Justice Rehnquist sorted through each study, identifying each of the studies' imperfections as replications of the decisionmaking process of death-qualified juries. Id. at 168-73. A sample of the Court's statement will illustrate the point:
McCree introduced into evidence some 15 social science studies in support of his constitutional claims, but only 6 of the studies even purported to measure the potential effects on the guilt-innocence
determination of the removal from the jury of Witherspoon-excludables.
Eight of the remaining nine studies dealt solely with generalized attitudes and beliefs about the death penalty ... and were thus, at best,
only marginally relevant to the constitutionality of McCree's conviction. . . . Of the six studies introduced by McCree that at least purported to deal with the central issue in this case . . .three were also
before this Court when it decided Witherspoon [when it found the data
too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to
the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of
guilt] .... It goes almost without saying that if these studies were 'too
tentative and fragmentary' to make out a claim of constitutional error in
1968, the same studies, unchanged but for having aged some 18 years,
are still insufficient to make out such a claim in this case.
Id. at 168-71 (footnotes omitted).
It is statements such as these that may lead one to see the Court, as mentioned earlier, as more fraudulent and duplicitous than merely confused and
unprincipled. In the analysis quoted from above, Justice Rehnquist has completely ignored the cumulative nature of the science, and instead appears to require that each study perfectly replicate the death-qualified jury. This, of
course, is completely contrary to the way data are considered in the social sciences, or any of the sciences for that matter, where converging evidence from
multifarious sources and types of studies, all pointing in the same general direction, actually strengthens the point being made. For Justice Rehnquist to claim
that three studies, deemed tentative and fragmentary in 1968 because they stood
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the Court's statement in an earlier case in which social science
evidence was at issue, that "[i]t is unrealistic to expect either
members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the
rigors of experimental or statistical technique."' 62 Most relevant
is Justice Rehnquist's illuminating comment in Lockhart that:
[W]e will assume for purposes of this opinion that the
studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to
establish that 'death qualification' in fact produces juries
somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-deathqualified' juries. We hold, nonetheless, that the constitution does not prohibit the States from 'death qualify163
ing' juries in capital cases.
In the 1976 death penalty cases, the Court was similarly unpersuaded by social science data indicating that execution was ineffective as a general deterrent and ruled that properly framed
statutes permitting the death penalty did not violate the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Constitution. 16 4 In Ingraham v. Wright, the Court refused to hold that corporal punishment
of school children was cruel and unusual. 6 5 Although there was
substantial research by psychologists supporting the contention
that physical punishment produced long-range negative effects, 16 6 the Court cited no empirical studies and relied mainly on
alone in the literature, must still remain such after substantial buttressing by
further research, is at best sophistic and at worst purposely deceitful. See generally JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 33-66 (2d ed.
1990) (describing empirical approach to social science and increased validity of
cumulative research).
162. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
163. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173. To social scientists, the majority opinion, to
say the least, is "disheartening," and will be a significant disincentive for future
experiments on the topic. "After McCree, there is little likelihood that additional
research on death qualification will influence the development of the law. Social
scientists who hope to see their research used in litigation and cited in legal
opinions would be well advised to work in another area." William C. Thompson, Death Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart v. McCree, 13 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 185, 205 (1989).
164. In five cases decided the same day, the Court rejected the social science evidence concerning the ineffectiveness of the death penalty as a deterent.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) ("Although some of the studies suggest
that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than
lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or
refuting this view."); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).

165. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
166. See, e.g., ALBERT BANDURA,

AGGRESSION: A SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS

(1973) (people are not always consistent in their response to aggressive behav-
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four or five unobtainable education texts and reports. The Court
noted that centuries of pedagological tradition and current state
legislation overwhelmingly sanctioned corporal punishment.
Thus the Court erroneously concluded that "[p]rofessional and
67
public opinion is sharply divided on the practice."'
As an aside, the Court's reliance on public opinion in Ingraham is instructive, as twelve years later, Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority in Stanford v. Kentucky, 168 rejected public opinion as
evidence of the evolving standards of decency. 169 In fact, like
.ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia rejected all social science
evidence in that case, disparagingly calling it "socioscientific" or
"ethicoscientific," but stating in deciding the issue that "socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific evidence is not
an available weapon." 70 This belittling of social evidence is reminiscent of Justice Powell's concurring opinion in the jury size
cases a decade ago when he acerbically noted, after Justice Blackmun's use of social science data in support of the holding that
five-person juries violated the Constitution, his "reservations as
to the wisdom-as well as the necessity-of Mr. Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on numerology derived from statistical
studies."171
Another possibly even more egregious rejection of social sciior);

ALBERT BANDURA &

R.H.

WALTERS, SOCIAL LEARNING AND PERSONALITY DE-

VELOPMENT (1963) (outlining set of social-learning principles emphasizing role
of social values); B.F. SKINNER, THE TECHNOLOGY OF TEACHING (1968) (applica-

tions of teaching machines that focus on reward rather than punishment); S.
Feshbach & N. Feshbach, Alternatives to CorporalPunishment, 2J. CLIN. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 46 (1973). See generally Hermaine H. Marshall, The Effect of Punishment
on Children: A Review of the Literature and a Suggested Hypothesis, 106 J. GENETIC
PSYCHOLOGY 23 (1965) (research on effect of punishment and negative reinforcement on children); NATIONAL EDUCATION AsS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK

(1972).
167. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 660 (footnote omitted). See also KNUTE LARSON &
MELVIN R. KARPAS, EFFECTIVE SECONDARY SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 146 (1963) (practical non-technical review of techniques for solving discipline problems); Irwin
A. Hyman & Jacqueline Clarke, Institutional Violence Directed Toward Children: The
Case of Corporal Punishment in the Schools, in TARGETS OF VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION. ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY 159 (Ronald Baenninger ed., 1991) (explanations for sanctioned use of overly severe disciplinary procedures in public
schools). See generally Donald N. Bersoff & David Prasse, Applied Psychology and
JudicialDecisionMaking: CorporalPunishment as a Case in Point, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY
400 (1978).
168. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
169. For a more complete discussion of Stanford, see supra notes 98-99 and
FORCE ON CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

accompanying text.

170. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378 (emphasis added).
171. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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ence data occurred in Bowers v. Hardwick, 172 the controversial,
heavily publicized five-four decision in which the Court in 1986
held that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right
upon consenting homosexuals to engage in oral or anal intercourse in private. 173 The APA contributed an amicus curiae brief in
that case, with a great deal of scientific and clinical data concerning the beneficial aspects of diverse methods of intercourse, the
absence of any evidence that either homosexuality or method of
intercourse is pathological in and of itself, and the harmful effects
of deterring such conduct. 174 Nonetheless, the Court rejected
this evidence and upheld sodomy statutes in an opinion that, in its
most favorable light, can only be described as medieval and callous. Research was ignored in favor of history and morality. Sodomy statutes, former Chief Justice Burger opined, were "firmly
rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards."' 175
By way of contrast, the Court relied on what it considered
172. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
173. See id.at 194. In Bowers, respondent had been charged with violating
the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by engaging in sodomy with another
male in the bedroom of his own home. Id. at 187-88.
174. See Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological Association, Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140). The APA Brief cited multiple
studies showing the harmlessness of homosexuality and the relative harmfulness
of society's proscriptions against it. See also WILLIAM MASTERS & VIRGINIAJOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE (1979) (suggesting attitude of tolerance

for range of ways individuals express their sexual needs with fellow humans);
Mona Cardell et al., Sex Role Identity, Sex Role Behavior, and Satisfaction in Heterosexual, Lesbian, and Gay Male Couples, 5 PSYCHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 488 (1981) (no significant differences in level of satisfaction with relationship between homosexual
and heterosexual couples); Arthur N. Gilbert, Conceptions of Homosexuality and Sodomy in Western History, 6 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 57 (1981) (exploring different approaches for writing the history of homosexuality: reporting on the formation of
homosexual subcultures, and studying the labelling and treatment of homosexual men and women);John C. Gonsiorek, Results of Psychological Testing on Homosexual Populations, 25 AM. BEHAVIORAL Sci. 385 (1982) (study finding
homosexuality is not related to psychopathology or psychological maladjustment); Sue Kiefer Hammersmith & Martin S. Weinberg, Homosexual Identity: Commitment, Adjustment and Significant Others, 36 SOCIOMETRY 56 (1973) (study finding
commitment to homosexuality positively related to stability of self-concept and
self-esteem); Maureen Hart et al., Psychological Adjustment of Nonpatient Homosexuals: Critical Review of the Research Literature, 39J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 604 (1978)
(reviews research finding that homosexuals are not any less well psychologically
adjusted than heterosexuals); Marvin Siegelman, PsychologicalAdjustment of Homosexual and Heterosexual Men: A Cross-National Replication, 7 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 1 (1978) (presenting results showing that homosexual and heterosexual
men are equally well adjusted). See generally Donald N. Bersoff & David N.
Ogden, APA Amicus Curiae Briefs: Furthering Lesbian and Gay Male Civil Rights, 46
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 950 (1991).
175. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
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adequate social science evidence when in H.L. v. Matheson, 176 it
said that the "emotional, and psychological consequences of an
abortion are serious and can be lasting ... particularly so when
the patient is immature." 1 7 7 The Court cited two articles to support its conclusion, 78 both published prior to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 179 when elective abortions were difficult to
obtain and most abortions were either illegal or performed only
for therapeutic reasons.' 8 0 The first article limited its study to
women receiving therapeutic abortions, that is, abortions where
there is a substantial risk that continuation of pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the woman.' 8 ' In
fact, the authors candidly admitted that "this study is sociologically skewed (since it draws in its entirety upon young unmarried
women) as well as methodologically skewed because of the high
refusal rate (which may have resulted in a heavier weighting toward those experiencing difficulties)." 8 2 The second article was
in fact an account of rather unsystematic psychoanalytic impressions of a sample of adolescents who carried their pregnancy to
83

term. 1

The most recent case exemplifying both the Court's duplicity
and its use of social science evidence when it serves its purpose is
Lee v. Weisman. I8 4 In Lee, the Court held that it was a violation of
176. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
177. Id. at 411.
178. Id. at411 n.20.
179. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
180. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-53 (1973) (surveying history of
abortion).
181. See Deborah Maine, Does Abortion Affect Later Pregnancies?, 11 FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 98 (1979).
182. See id.
183. Judith S. Wallerstein et al., PsychologicalSequelae of TherapeuticAbortion in
Young Unmarried Women, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 828 (1972). The extant research does not support the claim that adolescent abortions lead to any longterm psychological difficulties. See, e.g., Nancy Adler & Peggy Dolcini, Psychological Issues in Abortionsfor Adolescents, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL &
LEGAL ISSUES 74 (Gary Melton ed. 1986) (considering psychological issues involved in alternative of abortion during decision making phase before procedure); Michael B. Bracken et al., The Decision to Abort and Psychological Sequelae, 15
J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 155 (1974) (knowledge of abortion by parents
and partner not itself associated with positive reaction); Joy D. Osofsky & Howard J. Osofsky, Teenage Pregnancy: Psychosocial Considerations,21 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1161 (1978) (presenting data concerning psychological
antecedents, impact, and outcome of teenage pregnancy); Lisa Roseman Shusterman, The Psychological Factors of the Abortion Experience: A Critical Review, 1 PSYCHOLOGY WOMEN Q. 79 (1976) (finding psychological consequences of abortion
on request "mostly benign").
184. 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992).
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the Establishment Clause to allow clergy to offer a prayer as part
of official public middle and high school graduation ceremonies.
This may be a salutary outcome from a First Amendment perspective, but part of the Court's rationale was that allowing prayer in
public schools risked the indirect coercion of students who objected by placing them in the position of participating or
protesting:
We do not address whether that choice is acceptable if
the affected citizens are mature adults, but we think the
State may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause,
place primary and secondary school children in this
position. Research in psychology supports the common
assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to
pressure from their peers toward conformity, and that
the influence is strongest in matters of social
85
convention.
In support of this "common assumption" the Court relied on
three studies. 186 These studies, at best, only partially support the
Court's interpretation of the research. 18 7 I do not often agree
with Justice Scalia, but in dissent he complained that the majority
"invents a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion, which promises to do for the Establishment
Clause what the Durham rule did for the insanity defense."' 188
More pertinent is that the Court, once again, is quite amenable to
citing research that reinforces its concept of minors as passive,
unthinking, exploitable, and barely autonomous human beings
and ignoring research that demonstrates their ability to think and
act with a reasonable degree of maturity.
These may be rather depressing facts to bring up in a symposium celebrating interdisciplinary perspectives on autonomy held
185. Id. at 2658-59.
186. Id. at 2659 (citing Clay B. Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-Peer
Cross-Pressures, 28 AMER. Soc. REV. 385 (1963); B. Bradford Brown et al., Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity Dispositions, and Self-Reported Behavior Among

Adolescents, 22

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.

521 (1986); Donna Rae Classen & B.

Bradford Brown, The Multidimensionality of Peer Pressure in Adolescence, 14 J. YOUTH
& ADOLESENCE 451 (1985)).
187. Brittain concluded that the extent to which adolescents conform to
peer pressure is determined by the situation confronting them and that in many
instances "parents are perceived as the more competent guides." Brittain, supra
note 186, at 389. Brown et al. found that peer pressure was more salient in
guiding "prosocial" rather than antisocial activity. Brown et al., supra note 186,
at 529. See Classen & Brown, supra note 186, to the same effect.
188. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss6/2

36

Bersoff: Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme Court's Reckless

1992]

VULNERABLE POPULATIONS

1605

at one of a handful of universities to sponsor and generously support aJ.D./Ph.D. program in law and psychology. However, donning the mantel of optimism, I see these programs as producers

of legally sophisticated, scientifically knowledgeable scholars who
can conduct empirically sound, methodologically rigorous, situation-specific research. Such scholars are trained to avoid the inclination of clinicians and experimentalists to be advocates rather
than neutral scientists attempting to inform the courts. If these
programs continue to be successful, perhaps courts may finally
arrive at judicially and empirically justified decisions that will
withstand both legal and scientific scrutiny, finally recognizing
that autonomy is to be preferred to state-imposed beneficence.
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